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Abstract: This paper attempts to examine the effects of financialisation and leverage 
on China’s economic growth and income inequality. The empirical results suggest that 
the effects of the financialisation indicators are ambiguous and weak; however the 
leverage indicators do have negative impacts. We find that the ratio of non-financial 
private debt to GDP has significantly negative impact on China’s growth, whereas the 
effects of the ratio of public debt to GDP are insignificant. Moreover, at the 
disaggregated level of non-financial private debt, it is the higher non-financial 
corporate debt level rather than the household debt level that remarkably undermines 
China’s economic growth. Finally, we find that the rise in the household debt level 
could significantly reduce the income inequality, and the ratio of M2 to GDP is 
positively related with the income inequality in China.  
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Quantifying the Effects of Financialisation and Leverage in China 
 
1. Introduction 
The abrupt decline in the growth rate of China economy has attracted greater concerns 
since 2012. In this paper, we seek to uncover the connections of the recent slowdown 
with the evolutions of the financialisation and leverage indicators in China, and then 
identify the threshold levels for these indicators, inasmuch as they have important 
implications for the development strategy of China’s economy and finance.  
Financialisation is defined as the increasing significance of financial markets, 
financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and the 
decisions of policies, both at macro and micro levels (Epstein 2001, p.1). Its 
consequences, according to Pally (2007), include: (1) the elevation in the importance 
of the financial sector relative to the real sector; (2) the shift of income from the real 
sector to the financial sector; (3) the increase in income inequality; and (4) putting the 
economy at risk of debt deflation and prolonged recession. The final one implies that 
financialisation generates the over indebtedness in economic sectors and thereby 
depressing the economic growth
2
. Studies show that financialisation is most 
developed in the advanced economies, particularly in the US economy. However, 
emerging markets may also be infected and gradually evolve into financialisation. 
Given its adverse effects, in this paper, we introduce five variables, including the 
contribution of financial production to GDP, the growth rate of financial production, 
the ratio of the growth rate of financial production to the growth rate of industrial 
production, the ratio of the average wage level in the financial sector to the aggregate 
average wage level, and the ratio of M2 to GDP as the measuring indicators to test if 
financilazation has emerged in China’s financial system, and if so, what about its 
effects at macro level.  
Higher leverage often accompanies the process of financialisation. In this paper, 
leverage is defined by the ratio of debt to GDP. Our study mainly focuses on the ratio 
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of public debt to GDP, and the ratio of non-financial private debt to GDP.  The latter 
is partitioned into the ratio of household debt to GDP and the ratio of non-financial 
corporate debt to GDP. The global financial crisis of 2008 has renewed the research 
interests in studying the association of leverage with economic growth and 
distribution, because the bail-out packages implemented for weathering the global 
financial crisis have significantly expanded the leverages both in the advanced 
economy and in the emerging markets. Against this backdrop, China’s debt problem 
has also attracted considerable concern. Referring to the fresh literature on the 
leverage-growth nexus, this paper attempts to provide new evidence from China case.   
Our study extends the findings about the effects of financialisation and leverage 
on the economic growth and the income inequality by focusing on China economy. 
Using an extended Solow growth model, we find that the effects of the 
financialisation indicators on China’s p.c. GDP growth are ambiguous and 
insignificant, which reflects that financialisation in China is still under developed. 
Nevertheless, the stylized facts about the financialisation indicators, the preliminary 
evidence in this paper documenting the negative correlations between the 
financialisation indicators and the economic growth, especially, the higher ratio of 
broad money to GDP and its remarkably negative effects, all of these suggest that 
financialisation has been evolving and should be accorded more concerns in China. 
Most importantly, we find that the leverage indicators do negatively affect the p.c. real 
GDP growth in China. The ratio of non-financial private debt to GDP has significantly 
negative impact on China’s real p.c. GDP growth, whereas the effects of the ratio of 
public debt to GDP on the economic growth are insignificant. Moreover, at the 
disaggregated level of non-financial private debt, it is the higher non-financial 
corporate debt level (percentage to GDP) rather than the household debt level that 
remarkably undermines the growth of China’s economy. Finally, our empirical results 
suggest that the rise in the household debt level could significantly reduce the income 
inequality, and the ratio of M2 to GDP is positively related with the income inequality 
in China.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 presents the stylized facts about financialisation, the debt structure and the 
economic performance in China. Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology. 
Section 5 presents and analyses the results of the study. Section 6 makes the 
remarking conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There exists a vast of literature on the finance-growth nexus from the theoretical and 
the empirical aspects, where economists disagree about the impact of finance on 
growth. On one hand, a number of studies show that finance matters for economic 
growth; for example, World Bank (1989), and notable, King and Levine (1993), who 
conducted a cross country analysis using data on 80 countries over the 1960-1989 
period. Their empirical evidence suggests that financial system can promote economic 
growth by stimulating the physical capital accumulation and improving the economic 
efficiency. The empirical evidence from Rajan and Zingales (1998) support the above 
conclusions, however Arestis and Demetriades (1997) argued that the results from 
cross-country regressions may not accurately reflect individual country circumstances 
such as the institutional structure of the financial system, the policy regime and the 
degree of effective governance. They found that the cross country results exhibit 
substantial variation across countries using time-series estimations on individual 
countries. Furthermore, Levine (2000) examined the impacts of financial structure, 
featured by bank-based versus market-based financial systems, on economic growth 
using panel data. His research did not support either the bank-based or the 
market-based view, although overall financial development has robust correlations 
with economic growth. Levine (2004), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) 
provided comprehensive surveys on the connections between the operation of the 
financial system and economic growth from the theoretical and empirical aspects. 
They show that a well-functioned financial system exerts first-order impact on 
long-run economic growth through five functions: 1) producing information and 
allocating capital and thereby reducing the costs of transactions; 2) monitoring firms 
and exerting corporate governance to improve the efficiency of firms; 3) risk 
amelioration; 4) pooling of disparate savings for investment; 5) easing exchange of 
goods and services. Empirical evidence suggests that better developed financial 
systems may influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, 
and hence long-run economic growth. On the other hand, certain economists have 
stressed the endogenous instability of financial system and the damage effects of 
overdevelopment in the financial sector on the economic growth and distribution; for 
example, the well-known studies by Minsky (1992, 2008), Epstein (2001), Pally 
(2007), Hein and Treeck (2007, 2008). The global financial crisis of 2008 recalled the 
research interests in the associations of the overdevelopment in financial markets, 
namely financialisation, with the economic growth and financial cycles. Epstein (2001) 
provided a notable definition on financialisation and analysed the effects of 
financialisation by analysing the inflation targeting regime. Hein and Treeck (2007, 
2008) introduced an alternative definition on financialisation, which focuses on the 
micro factors such as the increasing power of the firms’ shareholders, the increasing 
debt-financed consumption of households and their effects on the growth and 
distribution. The shareholder-oriented firms will replace retain and invest strategy 
with down-size and distribute, which reduces the potential aggregate output on one 
hand, decreases the aggregate demand on the other hand.  The increase in the 
debt-financed consumption will accumulate the debt burdens for households and 
thereby depresses the aggregate demand and economic growth.  They examined the 
effects of financialisation on distribution and growth within Post-Keynesian models. 
Their theoretical analysis suggests that an expansive finance-led economy may build 
up major financial imbalances, i.e. increasing debt-capital or debt-income ratios, 
which make such economies prone to financial instability and undermine the 
economic growth and income distribution. Pally (2007) provided a survey about 
finncialization and analysed the channels through which financialisation affects the 
economic growth and distribution. He pointed out that financialisation impacts the 
economic system and depresses the long-run economic growth by three conduits, 
which include changing the structure and operation of financial markets, influencing 
the corporate behaviours, and reshaping economic policy framework. Moreover, 
many economists attribute the Great Recession since 2008 to financialisation in the 
advanced economies, which is in line with the influential theory about the business 
cycle constructed by Minsky (1992).  
Higher leverage may or may not be the consequence of financialisation, but the 
financial development over past decades did relax constraints on access to finance and 
increase the borrowings of households and non-financial corporates. Excess 
indebtedness often triggers a debt crisis, currency crisis and financial instability, 
thereby depresses long-run economic growth. The impacts of leverage on economy 
are complicated, which have been less understood by economics until now. Generally, 
low and moderate levels of debt help promote the welfare and economic growth, 
whereas high levels can be disaster
3
. This suggests a threshold effect of debt: when 
the regarding debt level exceeds the threshold value, dragging consequences on 
growth produce. Traditionally, the regarding studies particularly focus on the effects 
of public debt, especially when higher public debt-to-GDP is the consequence of 
expansion fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand, it could promote the output in 
the short run, but crowds out private capital spending and reduces output in the long 
run. Notably, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) use panel analysis to investigate the 
debt-growth nexus for advanced economies. They find that when the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90%, the build-up of debt is harmful to the 
economic growth. Cecchetti et al. (2011) examined the impacts of both public debt 
and non-financial private debt on the economic growth using a new database 
composing of 18 OECD countries for the 1980-2010 period. They reported the 
thresholds levels for the government debt, the non-financial corporate debt and the 
household debt to be 85%, 90%, and 85% of GDP, respectively. Against this backdrop, 
Chudik et al. (2015) tested for threshold effects in the context of dynamic 
heterogeneous panel data models with cross-sectional dependent errors and illustrate 
by means of Monte Carlo experiments. Using data on a sample of 40 countries 
(grouped into advanced and developing) over the 1965-2010 period, they didn’t find 
the evidence for a universally applicable threshold effect in the relationship between 
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public debt and economic growth when they account for the impact of global factors 
and their spillover effects. Nevertheless, their results indicate that there are significant 
negative long-run effects of public debt build-up on output growth. Most research in 
this topic ignore China’s case, our paper fills this gap and provides certain interesting 
implications.  
Finance development and Leverage have important impacts on the income 
inequality although the theoretical mechanisms are not very clear until now. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) summarized the effects of finance developments 
on inequality. Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990) pointed out that, on one hand, financial 
development might increase the availability and use of financial services by 
individuals who had not been employing those services because of price or other 
impediments, and thereby expand the economic opportunities of disadvantaged 
groups and reduce the intergenerational persistence of relative incomes; on the other 
hand, finance can enhance the financial services of those already accessing the 
financial system, which are frequently high-income individuals and well-established 
firms, and thereby widen inequality and perpetuating cross-dynasty differences in 
economic opportunity. Regarding the effects of financialisation, as we have discussed, 
within post-Keynesian models, Hein and Treeck (2007, 2008) find that 
financialisation undermines the equality in the distribution; similar conclusions are 
also provided by Pally (2007). On the correlations between the inequality and 
leverage, Rajan (2010) argued that the increase in the income inequality created 
political pressure, not to reverse that inequality, but instead to encourage borrowing to 
keep demand and job creation robust despite stagnating incomes, which raises the 
household leverage. When the leverages are unsustainable, defaults occurred 
following by financial instability. Using a DSGE model, Kumhof and Rancière (2013, 
2015) reported an endogenous interacting relation between the leverage and the 
income inequality in the US economy. They presented a strong comovement between 
increases in income inequality and increases in household debt-to-GDP ratios in both 
the period prior to the Great Recession and the period prior to the Great Recession. 
Their model shows that an increase in debt among bottom earners, which empirically 
has been the main driver of the leverage in overall households in the period prior to 
the Great Recession, leads to an increase in crisis risk. Our study tried to extend these 
finding under the context of the growing leverage and inequality in China’s economy   
 
3. Stylized Facts of Financialisation and Leverage in China 
As abovementioned, we use the contribution of financial production (hereafter FP) to 
GDP, the growth rate of FP, the ratio of average wage level in financial sector to the 
aggregate average wage level, the ratio of the growth rate of FP to the growth rate of 
industrial production (hereafter IP), and the ratio of M2 (broad money in China) to 
GDP as the indicators of financialisation. The leverage indicators are composed of the 
ratio of public debt to GDP and the ratio of non-financial private debt to GDP. The 
later are furtherly partitioned into the ratios of household debt to GDP and of 
non-financial corporation debt to GDP, respectively. In this section, we describe the 
changes in these indicators for the period of 1992Q1-2015Q2 in China. The quarterly 
data are collected from China Economic Information Networks database (hereafter 
CEIN), Wind database (hereafter Wind), and the Bank for International Settlements 
database (hereafter BIS).  
 
3.1 Changes in the Indicators of financialisation in China 
Figure 1 depicts the growth rates of China GDP, industrial production and financial 
production. It shows that the growth rate of financial production rose from 1.7% in 
1992q1 to its peak at 33.9% in 2007q3, and then fell to 7.7% in 2011q4, rebounded to 
the second peak at 17.4% in 2015q2, whereas the average growth rate of FP is less 
than 7% in the US for the same eriod. It has exceeded the growth rate of GDP since 
the fourth quarter in 2005, particularly for the period between Q3 2005 and Q2 2008, 
and the period between Q1 2012 and Q4 2014. Generally, the growth of GDP has the 
same trend as the growth of IP, but reversed trend as the growth of FP. The growth 
rate of GDP fell dramatically after 2012q2, whereas the growth rate of FP has 
distinguished risen since 2012q1. 
 
Figure 1 Growth Rates of China GDP, IP and FP (Percentage) 
 
Source: CEIN, WIND 
     Figure 2, Growth Rate of GDP, Contribution of IP and FP to GDP (Percent) 
 
Source: CEIN, Wind 
Figure 2 plots the contribution of financial production and industrial production to 
GDP, respectively. Prior to 2005, the contribution of financial production to GDP is 
lower and positively related with the growth rate of GDP. However, it demonstrates an 
increasing trend after the third quarter of 2005, and is reversely correlated with the 
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growth rate of GDP since the third quarter of 2008. The contribution of industrial 
production to GDP shows a positive relation with the growth rate of GDP over the 
sample period. 
The share of the employment in the financial sector in total employments, and the 
ratio of average wage level in financial sector to overall average wage level 
(Seasonally adjusted) in China are presented in Figure 3. It indicates that the wage 
income in the financial sector has risen dramatically since 2005 given its nearly 
constant employment share. In addition, the ratio of wage level in the financial sector 
to average wage level keeps up rising and remains higher than 150% since 2005, has 
attained 200% for the period of 2012-2015, whereas it is only 80% prior to 2005.  
Figure 3 Employment Share and Wage Ratio in the Financial Sector (Percent)  
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Ratio of Wage Level in the Financial Sector to Average Wage Level 
Share of Employments of the Financial Sector in Total Employments
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
   Figure 4 plots the ratios of broad money (M2), total deposits, total loans and stock 
value to GDP. These ratios generally measure the financial markets development. It 
shows that except the ratio of stock value to GDP, other three ratios have exceeded 
100% since 1998, and the ratios of M2 to GDP and total deposits to GDP have 
exceeded 150% since 2003. Moreover, the two latter ratios are nearly close to 200% 
after 2012.   
 
     Figure 4 Ratios of M2, Total Deposits, Total Loans and Stock Value to GDP 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
    
In particular, the contribution of FP to GDP and the growth rate of FP in China are 
remarkably higher than that in the US for the period of 2007q1-2009q4 and the period 
of 2012q1-2015q2. Moreover, the ratio of M2 to GDP in China rose from 93.6% (1.5 
times the ratio in the US) in 1992q4 to 193.6% in 2014q4, which is three times the 
ratio in the US, where financialisation is most developed. These seem to indicate that 
somehow financialisation has emerged in China and should be accorded serious 
concern. 
 
3.2 Changes in the Leverage Indicators in China 
Figure 5 presents the shares of China’s aggregate debt in 2013. It shows that China’s 
total debt is dominated by the domestic debt, in which public debt and non-financial 
private debt represent more than 60%. Therefore, we focus on the evolutions in public 
debt level and non-financial private debt level (percent to GDP) to examine the effects 
of the leverages. 
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             Figure 5 Share of China’s Total Debt at the End of 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
China’s public debt includes central government debt and local government debt. 
They are combined together as the general government debt according to the 
definition by IMF. In this paper, the public debt is defined at the general government 
level. China’s public debt attained 26180.99 billion yuan (RMB) in the end of 2014, 
which is nearly 20 times the level in 1995. The private non-financial debt attained 
122641.6 billion yuan in the end of 2014, which is 61.1 times the level in 1992. 
Household debt has increased approximately 111 times since 1992 and nearly 
quadrupled from 2007 to 2014, rising from 208.2 billion yuan in 1992 to 22921.5 
billion yuan in 2014. Non-financial corporate debt has increased nearly 42 times since 
1992 and nearly tripled from 2007 to 2014, rising from 2357.6 billion yuan in 1992 to 
99720 billion yuan in 2014.  
Both the ratios of the non-financial private sector and the public sector to GDP 
have risen since 1990s in China. The ratio of public debt to GDP is 41.3% in the end 
of 2014, which remains low by international standards
4
. The ratios of non-financial 
private debt to GDP had tripled by the end of 2014, attaining 193.3% of GDP. Driven 
by the increase in mortgage volumes, the ratio of household debt to GDP rose from 
7.73% in 1992 to 36.01% in 2014. The leverage in the corporate sector has increased 
steadily since 1999, rising from 87.57% (to GDP) in 1992 to 156.68% in 2014, which 
is one of the highest levels of corporate debt in the world. Figure 6 summarizes the 
changes in the leverages by sector. Particular concerns should be given with the 
                                                             
4
 The average ratio of public debt in OECD countries is above 100% in the same year. 
leverages in the private sector.  
            Figure 6 Evolutions of the Leverages by Sector 
 
Source: BIS and Author’s Calculation. 
         Figure 7 Leverages, GDP Growth Rate and CPI Inflation 
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Figure 7 shows the growth rate of GDP, CPI inflation, and certain leverage ratios. 
It shows that the increase in the leverage of the private sector is contrast with the 
decrease in the growth rate of GDP for the periods of 1992-1998 and 2009-2014, 
respectively. In addition, a rough reverse correlation appears between the private debt 
level and the rate of inflation, particularly for the period after the global financial 
crisis of 2008.  
 
3.3 The Income Inequality in China 
One of the important effects of financialisation and higher leverage is the increase in 
the income inequality. Figure 8 shows the change in the GINI coefficients and the 
indicators of financialisation and leverage from 1992 to 2014 in China. The GINI 
coefficient has remained above 0.40 since 2000, which demonstrates that the 
inequality of income distribution has being risen since the turn of 21
st
 century in 
China, and is the highest around the advanced economies and the emerging markets. 
Importantly, there appear remarkable positive relations between the ratio of private 
debt to GDP, the ratio of M2 to GDP and the Gini coefficient in Figure 8.  
            Figure 8 Financialisation, Leverage and Inequality 
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3.4 Preliminary Evidence  
To explore the effects of financialisation and leverage, first, we test the correlations 
between the indicators of financialisation and leverage and the growth rate of GDP. 
The results as rough and preliminary evidence are reported in Table 1. 
In Table 1, four important indicators of financialisation, the contribution of 
financial production to GDP: the ratio of average wage level in the financial sector to 
aggregate average wage, the ratio of M2 to GDP, and the ratio of the growth in 
financial production to the growth in industrial production, are negatively correlated 
with the growth rate of GDP. Moreover, two leverage indicators, non-financial private 
debt and public debt (percentage to GDP) are also negatively related with the 
economic growth (both by GDP and p.c. GDP) in China. Interestingly, the 
correlations between the financializaiton indicators and the p.c. GDP growth are 
diverse and ambiguous. 
 Table 1 Correlation between GDP Growth and Financialisation, Leverage  
 Growth 
Rate of 
FP 
 
Contributi
on of FP 
to GDP 
Ratio of 
Growth 
in FP to 
Growth 
In IP 
Ratio of 
wage 
level in 
FS* to 
Average 
Wage 
Ratio of 
M2 to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
Non-Finan
cial Private 
Debt to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
Public 
Debt to 
GDP 
Growth Rate of 
Real GDP p.c. 
0.588 0.169716 0.3675 -0.09796 0.1403 -0.09173 -0.10644 
Growth Rate of 
GDP 
0.36395 -0.29137 -0.17487 -0.27262 -0.31152 -0.47265 -0.23577 
CPI Inflation -0.06309 -0.2294 -0.30377 0.0943 -0.51453 -0.39236 -0.4229 
*FS: Financial Sector. 
Furthermore, we investigate the correlations of the indicators of finacializtion and 
leverage with the inequality indicator (GINI coefficient). The results are shown in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 indicates that both the financialisation indicators and the leverage 
indicators are positively correlated with the GINI coefficient, implying that both 
financialisation and the overindebtedness enhance the income inequality in China. 
Table 2 Correlations between Financialisation, Leverage and Income Inequality 
 Growth 
Rate of 
Financial 
Production 
 
Contributi
on of 
Financial 
Productio
n to GDP 
Ratio of 
Growth 
in FP to 
Growth 
In IP 
Ratio of 
wage level 
in FS to 
Average 
Wage 
Ratio 
of  M2 
to GDP 
Ratio of 
Non-Priv
ate Debt 
to GDP 
Ratio of 
Public 
Debt to 
GDP 
GINI 
Coefficient 
0.488 0.5765 0.5784 0.06914 0.8864 0.7737 0.6199 
Source: Author’s Estimation 
Referring to these preliminary evidence and the stylized facts, in the following, we 
seek to uncover the financialiation-leverage-growth nexus and 
financialisation-leverage-inequality connection in China by employing an extended 
Solow growth model, and identify the threshold levels for the leverage and 
financialisation indicators in accordance with Hansen (2000). 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
Following the regarding literature (Mankiew et al., 1992, 1995; Ding et al., 2009; 
Cecchetti et al., 2011), we employ an extended Solow growth model to examine the 
effects of financialisation and leverage on China’s economic growth: 
       +1t t k t t ty x z        ，                           (1) 
where 
1,
1
1 k
t t k t i
i
y y
k
  

   denotes the average value of the forward economic 
growth rates for k  periods. tx  is a vector of control variables; tz  is a vector of 
indicators for financialisation and leverage; ,   are coefficients vectors, 
respectively.    
In accordance with the literature of extended Solow growth models, to avoid the 
endogenous problem, we use the forward average growth rate of real GDP per capita 
for five periods as the dependent variable. Also to avoid the multicollinearity 
problems, we employ the stepwise regression approach. Our regressions satisfy the 
VIF tests and heterogeneity tests.  
The control variables in equation (1) include:  
A. Real GPD per capita at 0t , to capture the initial conditions of economic 
structure.  
B. Saving rate, share of national saving (public and private) in GDP. 
C. Population growth rate. 
D. Human capital, proxied by the education expenditure per capita. 
E. Openness, measured by the ratio of total foreign trade (exports plus imports) to 
GDP. 
F. Rate of Inflation, calculated by CPI index. 
G. Financial markets development index, measured by the ratio of total loans and 
total deposits to GDP.  
Data sources are descripted in Section 2. The sample period is from the first quarter 
of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 2014. 
On the threshold effects, we use the following regression:  
      + 1 1 2[ z ] [ z ]t t k t t t ty x J J             ，         (2) 
   where [ ]J   is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if event A 
occurs and zero otherwise.   denotes the threshold level for the concerning 
financialisation and leverage indicator tz . To search for the threshold levels for the 
indicators of financialisation and leverage, we use a Monte Carlo Simulations with 
bootstrap algorithm in accordance with Hansen (2000).  
   When testing the effects of financialisation and leverage on China’s income 
inequality (proxied by the GINI coefficient), we replace the dependent variable in 
regression equations (1) and (2) with the GINI coefficient. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Effects on Economic Growth 
Using equation (1), the basic growth regression and the extended growth regressions 
are conducted. Tables 3 and 4 summarise the regression results.  
 
Table 3 Effects of Financialisation on Economic Growth 
 (Dependent Variable: Future Average Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log real p.c. 
GDP 
0.0215 
(0.3129) 
0.022 
(0.314) 
0.054 
(0.31) 
0.018 
(0.315) 
-2.23** 
(0.99) 
0.21 
(0.44) 
National 
saving rate 
0.255*** 
(0.039) 
0.272*** 
(0.045) 
0.225*** 
(0.043) 
0.262*** 
(0.046) 
0.377*** 
(0.108) 
0.231*** 
(0.048) 
Population 
growth 
-21.28*** 
(4.60) 
-21.94*** 
(4.69) 
-20.33*** 
(4.58) 
-21.61*** 
(4.77) 
-14.91*** 
(28.39) 
-23.32*** 
(5.82) 
Human 
capital 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.096*** 
(0.016) 
0.093*** 
(0.016) 
0.089*** 
(0.016) 
0.095*** 
(0.016) 
0.114*** 
(0.021) 
0.1*** 
(0.016) 
CPI inflation 0.046* 
(0.025) 
0.041 
(0.026) 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
0.044* 
(0.027) 
0.187*** 
(0.056) 
0.049* 
(0.029) 
Financial 
index 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.048*** 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
Contribution 
of FP to GDP 
 -0.036 
(0.047) 
    
Growth of FP   0.029* 
(0.017) 
   
FP growth/  
IP growth 
   -0.049 
(0.17) 
  
FP wage/ 
overall wage 
    0.015* 
(0.009) 
 
M2/GDP      -0.007 
(0.031) 
R square 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.89 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.93 0.88 
***, **, and * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Standard deviations are reported in the paragraphs.  
 
First column in Table 3 provides the results for basic growth regression. Nearly all 
the variables are statistically significant excluding the log of per capita real GDP and 
the financial development index. The increase in national saving as the share of GDP 
promotes China’s future real per capita GDP growth. Trade openness and CPI 
inflation rate are also positively related with the per capita GDP forward growth rate. 
Interestingly, human capital plays a negative role in the growth of China’s future p.c. 
real GDP, which may reflect the fact that China’s economic growth was driven by the 
labour-intense forces, rather than the technological progress over the past decades. 
Population growth is negatively correlated with p.c. GDP growth. Our empirical 
results from the basic growth regression are similar as those from the advanced and 
other emerging economies excluding the effects of the human capital and the CPI 
inflation. 
Columns from 2 to 6 in Table 3 are the results of growth regression with the 
financialisation indicators. We find that three indicators including the ratio of M2 to 
GDP, the contribution of FP to GDP, and the ratio of FP growth to IP growth have 
negative impacts on China’s future p.c. GDP growth, but the effects are insignificant 
with the p values higher than 10%. Other three indicators, IP growth, the ratio of  
average wage in the financial sector to the overall average wage have positive effects, 
in which two effects are significance at 10% level. These results imply that the effects 
of financialisation on p.c. GDP growth are diverse and ambiguous in China. 
Columns from 1 to 4 in Table 4 show the effects of the leverage indicators on 
China’s p.c. GDP growth with the same extended growth model. The ratio of 
non-financial private debt to GDP has significantly negative effects on economic 
growth, whereas the effects of public debt level are insignificant. Moreover, it is the 
ratio of non-financial corporation debt to GDP rather than the ratio of household debt 
to GDP has the remarkably negative impact on the p.c. GDP growth. 
Inequality Effect: Furthermore, we add the GINI coefficient to the basic 
regression model to test the effect of the income inequality on China’s economic 
growth. Column 5 in Table 4 suggests that the income inequality significantly harms 
the economic growth.   
Table 4 Effects of Leverage and the GINI Coefficient on Economic Growth 
 (Dependent Variable: Future Average Growth of Real GDP per capita) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log real p.c. 
GDP 
-0.021 
(0.297) 
-2.79 
(1.80) 
-0.99 
(1.26) 
0.58 
(0.53) 
0.917* 
(0.492) 
National saving 
rate 
0.212*** 
(0.04) 
0.37*** 
(0.145) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
0.18*** 
(0.16) 
0.273*** 
(0.039) 
Population 
growth 
-14.01*** 
(4.94) 
35.64 
(75.76) 
111.58** 
(491) 
-30.3*** 
(6.50) 
-31.32*** 
(6.22) 
Human capital -0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
-0.019** 
(0.003) 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Trade Openness 0.081*** 
(0.016) 
0.046 
(0.038) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
0.07*** 
(0.016) 
0.102*** 
(0.016) 
CPI inflation 0.092*** 
(0.028) 
0.372*** 
(0.087) 
0.36*** 
(0.053) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
0.081*** 
(0.029) 
Financial index 0.038*** 
(0.013) 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
0.148*** 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.01 
(0.007) 
Private 
debt/GDP 
-0.066*** 
(0.021) 
    
Household 
debt/GDP 
 -0.09 
(0.07) 
   
Nonfinancial 
corporate 
debt/GDP 
  -0.19*** 
(0.03) 
  
Public 
debt/GDP 
   -0.043 
(0.043) 
 
Gini 
Coefficient 
    -19.29** 
(8.32) 
R square 0.90 0.96 0.98 0.92 0.90 
Adj. R square 0.89 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.89 
***, **, and * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Standard deviations are reported in the paragraphs. 
 
5.2 Effects on the Income Inequality 
In this subsection, we test the effects of financialisation and leverage on the income 
inequality. Following the above procedure in subsection 5.1, we replace the dependent 
variable, the p.c. real GDP growth, with the GINI coefficient. The regression results 
are summarized in Tables 6 and 7. 
          Table 6 Effects of Financialisation on the Income Inequality 
(Dependent Variable: the GINI Coefficient) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log real p.c. 
GDP 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
National 
saving rate 
0.0012** 
(0.0005) 
0.0009 
(0.0005) 
0.001** 
(0.0006) 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0009 
(0.0007) 
0.0015***
(0.0006) 
Population 
growth 
-0.465*** 
(0.0550 
-0.453***
(0.057) 
-0.469*** 
(0.056) 
-0.445*** 
(0.058) 
0.358* 
(0.18) 
-0.408*** 
(0.067) 
Human 
capital 
-0.0003*** 
(0.00005) 
-0.0003** 
(0.00005) 
-0.0003** 
(0.00003) 
-0.0002** 
(0.00003) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.00003) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
0.00046** 
(0.002) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.00007 
(0.0001) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
CPI inflation 0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0008** 
(0.00004) 
0.0013** 
(0.0003) 
Financial 
index 
0.00034*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00036** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00002 
(0.00006) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Contribution 
of FP to GDP 
 0.00054 
(0.0006) 
    
Growth of FP   -0.00007 
(0.0002) 
   
FP growth/  
IP growth 
   0.0024 
(0.002) 
  
FP wage/ 
overall wage 
    0.00007 
(0.00005) 
 
M2/GDP      0.0001*** 
(0.0003) 
R square 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.71 0.97 
Adj. R square 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.65 0.97 
***, **, and * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Standard deviations are reported in the paragraphs.  
The first column in Table 6 shows that all the explanatory variables are significant 
in explaining the income inequality at least at 5% significance. The real p.c. GDP, 
national saving rate, trade openness, CPI inflation and the financial development have 
positive impacts on the income inequality in China since 1992, suggesting that 
China’s economy is still on the left slope of the Kuznits curve. Most importantly, the 
increases in the population growth and the human capital can reduce the income 
inequality!  
        Table 7 Effects of Leverage on the Income Inequality  
(Dependent Variable: the GINI Coefficient) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log real p.c. GDP 0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.02** 
(0.008) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.049*** 
(0.007) 
National saving rate 0.001** 
(0.0006) 
0.003*** 
(0.0006) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Population growth -0.48*** 
(0.063) 
0.86** 
(0.33) 
1.19*** 
(0.37) 
-0.54*** 
(0.088) 
Human capital -0.0003*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
-0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.00003) 
Trade Openness 0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
0.00003 
(0.0002) 
0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
CPI inflation 0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
-.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007* 
(0.0002) 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
Financial index 0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0001** 
(0.00006) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
Private debt/GDP 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
   
Household debt/GDP  -0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
  
Nonfinancial 
corporate debt/GDP 
  0.00006 
(0.0002) 
 
Public debt/GDP    0.00009 
(0.0006) 
R square 0.96 0.90 0.86 0.96 
Adjusted R square 0.96 0.87 0.82 0.96 
***, **, and * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Standard deviations are reported in the paragraphs. 
 
Columns from 2 to 6 in Table 6 present the effects of the financialisation 
indicators on the income inequality. Only the ratio of M2 to GDP has significantly 
positive impact on the income inequality. This implies that an active monetary policy 
could increase the income inequality. The effects of other indicators on the income 
inequality are insignificant.  
Columns from 1 to 4 in Table 7 report the effects of the leverage indicators. It is 
worth noting that the household debt level has significantly negative effect on the 
income inequality, suggesting that the rise in household debt level (percent to GDP) 
helps reduce the income inequality in China. Other leverage indicators have less 
(insignificant) impact on the income inequality in our empirical study. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our study suggests that China’s financial system has not yet evolved into 
financialisation as that in certain advanced economies. Nevertheless, certain 
indicators of financialisation, such as the ratio of M2 to GDP and the growth rate of 
financial production, has remarkably exceeded their threshold levels since 2005, 
which are unsustainable and should be accorded more concerns by the policymakers. 
We find that the leverage indicators do have negative impacts on China’s economic 
growth. The ratio of non-financial private debt to GDP has significantly negative 
impact on China’s real p.c. GDP growth, whereas the effects of the ratio of public debt 
to GDP on economic growth are insignificant. Moreover, it is higher non-financial 
corporate debt level (percentage to GDP) rather than the household debt level that 
remarkably undermines the growth of China’s economy. The highest non-financial 
corporate debt level around the world has produced dragging effects on China’s 
economic growth, and a long process for deleveraging in the non-financial corporate 
sector is waiting for China before it restores to the normal growth equilibrium.  
In addition, we find that the rise in the household debt level could significantly 
help reduce the income inequality, which coincides with the theory that financial 
development increases the access of low and middle income households to financial 
services (borrowing), and thereby expand the economic opportunities of 
disadvantaged groups and reduce persistence of relative incomes. That the ratio of M2 
to GDP is positively related with the income inequality in China implies the adverse 
distribution effects of an active monetary policy.  
Further researches are needed to explore the channels through which the 
indicators of financialisation and leverage affect China’s economy.  
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